Here are all the Oil Position reports I could find for 1940

Oil position papers 1.zip contains the 16th, 20th, 21st, 23rd, 24th and 25th weekly Oil Position War Cabinet Reports

Oil position papers 2.zip contains the 27th, 28th, 32nd and 40th

Monthly Oil Position.zip has July, September, October and November '40

100 oct plants has a couple of memos about 100 octane production in the UK

I haven't read them all yet, but some people here may find them usefull.

I'm gonna look at 1939 next.

EDIT : I didn't explain what these are.. They are all War Cabinet documents detailing the import, consumption, production etc of all types of fuel for the Air Force, Navy and Civil.

Pretty much the same as everywhere else for low altitude and subsonic aerodynamics.....

http://navyflightmanuals.tpub.com/P-303/P-3030021.htm


There is thing called the Paris Convention of 1919. It is what gives British Aircraft the authority to fly in other countries, including the USA.

What it says in summary, we will all do things the same way regarding airplanes and meet the same standards.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Par...ention_of_1919

They are not different papers. They are subsequent reports in the same trail of papers, prepared by the same men, working for the Enemy Oils & Fuels Committee.

The report quoted by 'gbailey' deals only with German 87 octane fuel samples, and the subsequent papers deal with German 100 octane fuel samples. But they are prepared by the same people - D. A. Howes of Anglo American Oil for example is listed just the same in samples I have posted - in the same format, and follow each other in the files, and reference to the other reports, so its very hard to miss the fact that you are not looking at the whole paper.

Of course if you are set out to prove that the American contribution of high octane aviation fuel was not significant, and the Brits could do it all by themselves, you might also want to 'prove', by omitting otherwise available information that those poor Germans had to do with whatever British 100 octane stock they could find.

Of course such views become very comical, when you know that Germany was producing domestically all its 100 octane needs, while Britain was importing it or later given by Lend-Lease, and in fact that British desire in 1938 for 100 octane was fueled by fear that German synthetic plans could essentially produce as much 100 octane as they wanted, and Britain did not want to be left behind in the technology race.

Either its quite simply intellectually dishonest to say the Germans had nothing else but 87 octane fuel, and relied on captured British 100 octane stock, because a report on German 87 octane fuel samples - surprise surprise! - lists only 87 octane fuel samples and one British 100 octane sample. Especially when the next report in the pile of papers says that German 100 octane fuel samples were found in 110s, 88s etc. in the same period.

That may even be a honest mistake, but in that case the 'research' was very superficial and amateurish.

Either case, whoever he is, his opinion is sadly mistaken and instead of addressing it and admitting the mistakes, he resorts to incivility and thin verbal diarrhea.

I would also like to know your version. Do you believe the Germans did not use 100 octane in the Battle of Britain? Do you believe that the only 100 octane they had access to was captured British stocks?

Well, again 25 (was it 30 with XIVs..?) Squadrons of Spitfires in 1945 required 15 000 tons of avgas per month. Their tanks were the same size, their sortie times were again pretty much the same lenght as those of 1940.

But let's forget about the 2nd TAF. I've just found a rather interesting table which shows the ratio of combat hours and non-operational hours flown by a plane sorties/time for planes on hand with combat units (i.e. the ones in OTU, storage, manufacturer's flight testing is not included) in mid-1943.

http://www.fischer-tropsch.org/Tom%2...0Item%201A.pdf

For Spitfires in NW Africa, an average of 13.2 combat sorties were flown per plane per month, the average combat hours flown per month per plane was 18.5 hours, the non-operational hours flown per month per plane was 19.7 hours. Hourly consumption was 49.7 gallons/hour.

The ratio for P-47s in the UK was very similar, it was 16.3 hours per month for combat sorties and 17.3 for non-operational flights.

So combat sorties amounted quite typically to about just 40% of the total consumption. The remaining 60% is non-operational flights in combat units, which none of your calculations take into account, nor the requirements of bomber command's Blenheim Sqns.

Kurfurst,

I don't want to further encourage your behaviour by responding, but in this case I can't help myself.

If 'gbailey's claimed identity is true, I am afraid that would be even more concerning, as there is a proven misrepresentation of a historical source and probably worthy to the attention of the Rector of Dundee University, as well as Professor Black and Professor Dobson, for further investigation into professional standards and lack of civil conduct in the public, which may pose questions about the suitability of the candidate, who refuses to address the question directly, upon having been caught in the act.

I look forward to the results of your contact with Professors Dobson and Black, particularly as I share an office with Tony Black, and regularly speak to Alan Dobson who was my PhD supervisor and who remains a respected colleague. I suspect all three of us would welcome the entertainment at the moment.

Their email addresses are available on the same web page as I provided earlier, which also has my email address (in case that was presenting you with any difficulties).

Hopefully you will not experience the same difficulty contacting them as you seem to have experienced in contacting me to date. I can assure you that any complaint you make will be regarded with the merit it deserves.

In that respect, in case you want any pointers in how to research and present genuine historical inquiry, I direct you to Tony's excellent second edition of The History of Islamic Political Thought from the Prophet to the Present, and Alan's recent and commendable FDR and Civil Aviation.

Gavin Bailey

Osprey,

It is a fact the January 1942 Pilots Operating Notes for the Spitfire Mk Ia stating 100 Octane is for ALL OPERATIONAL UNITS. That fact is a very damning piece of evidence for any argument all operational units converted at any date before January 1940.

It is a huge "fly in the oinment" to the crowd claiming Fighter Command converted in the Spring 1940. People in this thread have bought into a position based on logistical documentation and not on operational documentation.

The Operating Notes are operational documentation and the logistical documentation showing the fuel supply at the airfields confirms Morgan and Shacklady's research of around 16 squadrons sometime in September 1940.

The argument the document combines fuel at the airfields from 1938 until June 1940 does not hold up to scrutiney. Why?

The process for manufacturing 100 Octane gasoline cheaply and in quantity only existed for one year in 1938.

http://www.nacatsoc.org/history.asp?HistoryID=30

Before catalytic cracking, making 100 Octane fuel was possible only in small quantities and it was very expensive to manufacture.

In 1936 the United States decided to adopt 100 Octane. The Aeronautics Branch of the Department of Commerce, NACA, and Department of Defense laid out a ten year plan to convert all aviation to 100 Octane fuels. The first to convert would be the USAAF and their experience would be used to convert all Civil Aviation. Before any of that could begin, the first priority was finding a way to make 100 Octane cheaply and in quantity. That was not a possibility until 1937.

I highly doubt the Air Ministry had 100 Octane fuels in any substantial quantity in 1938.

As is all the operational squadron records posted that say otherwise to your position that you keep ignoring.

I trust them not you, someone who can't even distinguish modern day peace time rules and regs with that of a war in 1940.

Please both of you drop the attacks on each other and just discuss the facts. Acting immaturely does not add credibility to anyone.

Fruitbat,

I have not ignored any evidence at all. Re-read those squadron logs, please. The technical order specifies aircraft will be converted on their schedules Service Inspections. When that conversion is complete, by convention it will be a logbook entry. Most importantly, if they are actually using the fuel that will also be a specific logbook entry by convention. It will plainly state they are using 100 Octane. Not only will their aircraft be logged as converted, it will be logged they are actually using the fuel.

A single entry of aircraft being converted does not mean they are running around using 100 Octane fuel, only that the aircraft is capable of using it if available and authorized. When my aircraft was converted to use auto fuel, it too got a logbook entry noting it was Supplemental Type Certificated for auto fuel. The aircraft was properly placarded too. That does not mean autofuel is in my fuel tanks!!

It just means the airplane has the capability to use it.

It is the exact same thing with the conversion to 100 Octane. You just can't put the fuel in the tanks and fly off. The airplane has to be placarded, major changes done to the engine, and the proper knowledge given to the pilots as well those that maintain the aircraft. Why, because it is the law and that law conforms to international aviation convention that has been in place since 1919.

The conversion was done on a schedule at the annual Service Inspection. That is what gave the manufacturer time to make the cylinder heads and logistics to distribute them. Once the Operational conversion was ready to adopt 100 Octane fuel, new Operating Notes would be published reflecting that change as we see in January 1941. There is some lag time. I would bet the RAF began conversion in June 1940 and fully converted sometime in December or November, 1940 before the wartime British end dates for the Battle of Britian. That is why you find references to the RAF converting during the battle.

So what about the combat reports that show the use of +12 boost, which was only allowed in when 100 octane fuel was used?

exactly.

I see your response again is limited again to venting out bit of hot air. I hope you now feel relieved and content, and shall find engaging in academic debate less stressful on your capacity to defend your (mistaken) point of view.

Alas, I must note that you still failed to properly address your earlier attempt to misrepresent the historical truth, so I must take your deep and lasting silence on issue of misrepresenting historical sources as a sign that you have recognized your error and you have choose to revoke your earlier nonsense about the German 100 octane use in the Battle.

I hope your future 'research' in the subject of the Luftwaffe aviation fuels shall be far more successful, less amateurish than your earlier attempts showed. On my part, I have found the debate most rewarding, given the end result and your hollow but futile arrogance.

writing about yourself?

"If it looks like a duck, sounds like a duck, flies like a duck......then, by gawd, it IS a duck." A 100-octane duck! :grin:

They are different papers. We are looking at the BOB and its that period that is of interest. Obviously things changed latere but in the BOB period it looks as if the Luftwaffe used captured stocks for at least some of their aircraft.

I haven't read the paper but trust official documents

I do not doubt that the same people prepared later papers but we are looking at the BB period

It does look like that in the BOB period doesn't it.

Unfortunately Germany never did produce sufficient for its needs

Not the same period a later period, your own paper proves it.

This from the man who never even tried to get a copy of the Pips posting is pretty good.

Important note, we know who he is, we know where he works, we know that he is open to being contacted, we know know who he works with, we know nothing about you. As for resorting to incivility, do you really want me to go through this thread and list the jibs and worse that you have aimed at everyone? More importantly do you want me to list the questions you have refused to reply to?
I don't know and am not guessing, but it makes sense that the Luftwaffe would use RAF stocks probably in addition to some of their own. Its valuble fuel and there is no point pouring it away. There is no doubt that the report was very specific in saying that the only example was RAF stock, that you can rubbish or deny but doesn't alter that fact that is what the report says..

I go from evidence which can be measured not made up calculations, there is the old phrase that there are lies, damned lies and statistics. However I did point out that operational vs non operational consumption in May 1941 was approx 50%.

Certainly. The papers quite clearly state the British first captured samples of German synthetic, 'Green' C-3 100 octane fuel during the Battle of Britain. That is to say, the claim that the Germans were relying completely on captured British 100 octane stocks is demonstrated to be false and unfounded, and against what is said in the very series of reports.

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/att...t-2-c3_003.jpg
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/att...t-2-c3_005.jpg

Yes, we should look at the BoB period.

The papers say the British obtained four samples of German produced synthethic C-3 in the BoB period:

Sample GF 28 from a Ju 88, in 'Summer of 1940'.
Sample 40/41 from a Bf 110, on '27 September 1940'.
Sample GF 31 from a Bf 110, in 'Automn 1940'.
Sample GF 32 from a Bf 110, in 'Automn 1940'.

All of these were samples of German produced 100 octane fuel. Summer of 1940, 27 September 1940, Automn of 1940 does sound like BoB period to me.

They list one sample of what is believed captured British 100 octane.

Denial in the face of this evidence is beyond comic.

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/att...2-c3_table.jpg

Again, four samples of German 100 octane, one sample of British 100 octane was found in the BOB period and listed in these papers. To claim the only sample was found and it was from British source is simply false and ill-informed.

That's a curious statement. It does seem to me that in the first half of 1941, practically all of the German first line fighters (Bf 109E/N, Bf 109F-1, F-2) were running on 100 octane fuel.

Again my own paper lists samples of German produced 100 octane fuel, from Summer of 1940, 27 September 1940, Automn of 1940, which does sound like the same BoB period.

Claimed by the man who repeatedly lies that I did not try to get a copy of Pips posting despite I have made clear several times that I did contact pips and searched the online archives. Cute.

Well I know he appears everywhere NZTyphoon appears, he has misrepresented a piece of historical evidence, made a revisionist claim about the German use of 100 octane fuel in the Battle, refuses to post his papers, and does not answers any questions.

That's more than enough for me to assert his level of credibility, whoever he is.

Please do. Go ahead an entertain me. I can go an list how many times I have answer the same questions you keep asking, and how many times you have refused to post the full contents of the papers you are referring to, despite repeatedly asked.

Well again the report is indeed very specific about that the British found several samples of C-3, and readily acknowledged its use during the Battle of Britain. You seem to be in denial of German 100 octane use in the Battle of Britain.

Its interesting though. You claim all British fighter squadrons were using 100 octane during the Battle and deny that the Germans were using their own 100 octane at the same time. A not so well hidden agenda perhaps..?

Well its hard evidence, but we seem to agree to dismiss NZTyphoon's calculations on the ground of it's unreliability and gross simplicity.

All pages taken from the National Archive, from various weekly or monthly Oil Position reports.
All are available free to download from the NA's website.
http://i822.photobucket.com/albums/z...cab68-3-43.jpg

http://i822.photobucket.com/albums/z...ab68-4-42b.jpg

from the same report
http://i822.photobucket.com/albums/z...cab68-4-42.jpg

http://i822.photobucket.com/albums/z...cab68-4-50.jpg

http://i822.photobucket.com/albums/z...cab68-5-19.jpg

http://i822.photobucket.com/albums/z.../cab68-6-6.jpg

http://i822.photobucket.com/albums/z...b68-42-27b.jpg

http://i822.photobucket.com/albums/z...ab68-42-27.jpg

Consumption from start of war.
http://i822.photobucket.com/albums/z...onsumption.jpg

What shortage are we talking about...?

Those are good evidence only when placed in context in a timeline. Without context, they are useless.

they show the date.:rolleyes:

The trouble for you is that this is a fly in your ointment.

http://www.il2bugtracker.com/issues/174

I would have mentioned 'crowd' but I don't think "Crump & Kurfurst" constitutes one lol

Frankly, you and your bumpal can say whatever you like - the game is over, and in the end not only have you lost but you've lost credibility too. You mug lmao

Who cares??

I don't play Cliffs of Dover. I only went to graduate school for aeronautical sciences, own/operate aircraft, and restore WWII fighters. My interest is purely personal without any stake in your game.

That is why I ignore you unless something peaks my interest.

You guys paid for a game and IMHO, the developers should give you what you want to enjoy it. If facts were opinion and the majority opinion mattered; we would not have things like civil rights law.

Judging by the number of posts you've written in this thread, I'd say you care.

And I don't play CloD either. Rubbish rig.

I don't deny that this is interesting but your still looking at the wrong paper. Its also interesting that they were only used in me110 and Ju88 aircraft which were outclassed in combat when fighting spitfires and Hurricanes. So the Luftwaffe may have had some but it didn't have an im pact on the fighting and clearly it was in small numbers.

But when the DB 605 was first built it was for B4 not the C3 fuel, different versions of the engine were built for the different fuel and for most of the war the 109 normally used B4.

There is a difference and its a large one. All my statements are supported by documents which are posted. However you failed and you did admit to me that you hadn't tried the Australian Archive the one place that was supposed to have it.



You have his details, send him an e'mail, then you will know, thats what researchers do isn't it, check facts?

I should add that he also appears where I appear. He hasn't misrepresented any facts and you don't have the paper you claimed to have, i.e. the one up to October 1940 which he was quoting from. In other words the misrepresentation, is yours, not his.


I have offered three times for you to tell me which paper you are talking about and if I don't have the entire paper, I will get it for you next week when I go to the NA, this offer is still open until Monday, call my bluff.

No I am not. I clearly said that I didn't know but it made sense to use the 100 Octane as well as German fuel. Nowhere did I deny the use of German use of 100 Octane. Please post where I said what you claim, if you cannot then at least read my posting before replying.

I believe this to be the case but believe that my case is a strong but not perfect one. Again I repeat that I have never said that the Luftwaffe didn't use German 100 octane.


His calculations have a far more logical set of assumptions than yours, but you are correct, I don't rely on calculations.

Yes and they tell you that unit was using the fuel on that date. They don't say "All Operational Units" nor do they say if the unit was using it on any other day.

Again, the 1942 Pilots Operating Notes for the Spitfire Mk I is a damning piece of evidence against the claim "All Operational Units".

I'm still waiting for a reply.

LOL.. good point!

And how many units were actually flying the Mk1 in 1942, lol.

Interesting but you cannot answer operational questions with logistical answers.

If you compare the fuel at the airfields in September 1939 with the strategic reserves of 87 Octane you can get an idea of the ratio's they used.

Usually it is about 40:1 between Strategic Reserves and point of use. 16,000 tons at the airfields in September thru November 1939 leaves us ~8,000 tons per month.

Strategic Reserves of 87 Octane from 31 August 1939 to 7 December 1939 is (323,000 + 309,00)/2 = 316,000 tons

316,000 tons / 8,000 tons = 35.5

Now, they will maintain that ratio as best they can. It represents the 18 weeks of fuel in reserve.

So with 146,000 tons of fuel, roughly 3825 tons was usable. Now that 8,000 tons per month is training and administrative flying, not operational. When the war starts, 3825 tons is less than a quarter of the fuel required to conduct operational, training, and administrative flying.

Anyway, it is interesting but not applicable because it is logistical documentation and not operational.

You make me laugh Crump. You are 'special' aren't you!

Exactly Fruitbat....

It is an indicator of the importance of the change over to 100 Octane.

Do you really think if it occurred earlier they would not have immediately republished the Operating Notes?

Of course they would have republished them. It was a legal requirement from the Air Ministry by convention and our June 1940 Pilots Operating Notes would appear with the same notation for "ALL OPERATIONAL UNITS - 100 OCTANE ONLY".

The fact none of the operational documentation reflects that notation prior to January 1942 is a huge indicator.

Absolute rubbish. I posted these documents in response to the repeated claims made that there was a shortage of 100 octane fuel. There wasn't.

So, you're saying that the British sat on over 100,000 tons of fuel because they needed a reserve? When the threat of invasion was looming...?
.

For operational documentation see the combat reports.

Its the a different paper, same series of reports. I think its unnecessary to debate this any further.

As for the use of 100 octane, initially it was used by 3 Wings of 110s and 1 Wing of 109s (JG 26). The British quite simply did not found samples of 100 octane in downed 109s, which is not surprising considering they only got a couple of dozen samples. The fact that some Ju 88s were also running on 100 octane were found is interesting, considering that they would be unlikely to benefit from it at all. I would agree it did not have much effect on the fighting, save for the 110s. The stock 109s already had more than enough performance.

As for outclass, I would disagree. Looking at the increase of output from the 601N, I would estimate that 110 could do about 550-560 kph at altitude, ie. as fast as Spitfires and much faster than Hurricanes, 109E with the 601N were likely to get about 590 kph - much faster than anything else out there at altitude.

110s had priority initally, in the automn a 4th Gruppe was converted to 601N/100 octane. 109s at first were limited to one Gruppe (wing), then it October it was decided that they should get priority for 601Ns.

The complete story is described in the General of the Luftwaffe meetings by Mankau and Patrick, which I summerized briefly recently:

Currently Il-2:COD does not model the Luftwaffe's 100 octane fighters. These were equipped with the DB 601N in Bf 110C and Bf 109E, and hence received the suffix of /N to their designation (ie. Bf 109E-4/N, E-5/N, E-7/N etc.)

DB 601N powered variants appeared since July 1940, the start of the Battle. Approximiately half the Bf 110C and one Gruppe (Wing) of Bf 109E was using the 100 octane engine during the Battle, so the numbers, especially 110 were significant.

The 100 octane units can be identified as the following: III/ZG 26, Erpobunggruppe 210, II/ZG 26, II/ZG 76, one Gruppe of JG 26.

The DB 601N featured increased ratings and altitude performance. It ran on the Luftwaffe's C-3 fuel, of 95 (lean) and 110 (rich) performance. The 601N entered production in the end of 1939.

Power curve for DB 601N as installed in Emil (Bf 109F version had more powerful supercharger)
http://imageshack.us/photo/my-images...ercurvebw.jpg/

100 octane use in the Luftwaffe during the Battle of Britain:

On the 12 July 1940 General der Luftwaffe meeting, it was noted that DB 601N engines are to be installed primarly into Bf 110s, then its followed in the serial production Bf 109E.

On the 19 July 1940 General der Luftwaffe meeting, it was noted DB 601N engine are installed in frontline Bf 110s. So far 1 Gruppe of Bf 109E was fitted with the new engine. The Bf 109F entering production is also using the 601N engine.

On the 26 July 1940 General der Luftwaffe meeting, the General Staff requesting more Bf 110 to be fitted with DB 601N. Decision would be made in the end of August 1940.

On the 9 August 1940 General der Luftwaffe meeting, it was noted that 3 Gruppen of Bf 110 and one Gruppe of Bf 109 was fitted with DB 601N. Increased installations require increasing the reserve of DB 601N motors.

On the 30 August 1940 General der Luftwaffe meeting, it was noted that for 280 'active' DB 601N motors, the no. engines in reserve is to reach 180.

On the 27 September 1940 General der Luftwaffe meeting, it was noted that the Chief of Staff decided that 4 Gruppen of Bf 110 is to be fitted with 601N and the number to be maintained. 1/3 of the remaining DB 601N engines is to be reserved as replacement engines for frontline units, and the remaining 2/3s are to be released to be installed in Bf 109 aircraft.

On the 18 October 1940 General der Luftwaffe meeting, it was noted that apart from the already present 1 Bf 109 Gruppe with DB 601N, no more is possible to be equipped. Existing DB 601N are required by: 1, New production Bf 109F 2, New production Bf 110 delivered by Mtt AG as replacement to the existing 4 Bf 110 Gruppen with 601N 3, 40 replacement Bf 109E (conversions) to maintain the strenght of the 1 Bf 109 Gruppe with 601N. 5, Replacement/reserve engines for 1, 2, and 3.

On the 26 October 1940 General der Luftwaffe meeting, it was noted that by the end of October, 1100-1200 DB 601N engines were delivered, and were used for the 4 Gruppen of Bf 110 and one Gruppe of Bf 109 equipped with DB 601N, and to maintain these units with replacements, and furthermore to recon units under Luftwaffe High Command. The remaining engines are used for Bf 109F-1, F-2 production. 130 engines were reserved for circulation (replacement). All Bf 110s produced, apart from the DB 601N equipped ones by Mtt AG are to be directed to maintain the strenght of 120 of night fighter units.

On the 6 November 1940 General der Luftwaffe meeting, it was noted that General Staff requested all DB 601N engines to be installed in Bf 109E. In order to free up engines, 2 months worth of production (November, December) of Bf 110s produced by Mtt is to engined with DB 601A instead of 601N. 601N engines are to be distributed: 1) Final production series of Bf 109E 2) Replacement engines for III/ZG 26, Erpobunggruppe 210. If 601N engines are not available in sufficient quantities, the following Gruppen can be given 601A as replacement engines: II/ZG 26, II/ZG 76. As the production of 601N in January 1941 will be considerably greater, Bf 110 production shall switch completely to 601N.

On the 22 January 1941 General der Luftwaffe meeting, it was reported that on 1 January 1941, the following number of DB 601N engines were installed in frontline aircraft.

in Bf 109s
Bf 109E-1 : 16 pcs, Bf 109E-3 : 1 pc, Bf 109E-4 : 54 pcs, Bf 109E-6 : 1 pc, Bf 109E-7 : 34 pcs, Bf 109E-8 : 2pcs. Bf 109F-1 : 5 pcs.
Total 112 Bf 109E with DB 601N present in service, plus 5 Bf 109F.

in Bf 110s
Bf 110C-1 : 4 pcs, Bf 110C-4 : 40 pcs, Bf 110C-5 : 12, Bf 110C-7 : 14 pcs, Bf 110D-0 : 18 pcs, Bf 110D-2 : 20 pcs, Bf 110D-3 : 8 pcs, BF 110E-1 : 176 pcs, Bf 110E-2 : 14 pcs.

Total : 306 engines, ie. 153 Bf 110s with DB 601N present in service.

in Misc. types
He 111P : 8 pcs, Do 215 : 68 pcs.

By 1st April, the following conversion to DB 601N is planned: 6 Gruppen of Bf 110 = 480 engines, 5 Gruppen of Bf 109E-7/N = 200 engines, 12 Gruppen of Bf 109F = 480 engines, 'Rowehl' = 70 engines. This means by 1 April appx. 850 DB 601N engines will be in active operation.

etc.

Source: Pages 24-29 in Heinz Mankau/Peter Petrick : Messerschmidt Bf 110, Me 210, Me 410. Aviatic Verlag, 2001. ISBN: 392550562

Yes, more or less so. We have discussed that beforehand. The 601E in mid 1941 already reverted to 87 octane B4, but it developed a lot more power - ca. 1400 HP - than the 601N on 100 octane. Apparently, the 601E was a superior design.

The 605A series built on the 601E and continued with 87 octane. They were held back by technical difficulties with the oil system, but still, when these were fixed could produce 1475 HP at takeoff on 87 octane. A different 605, the 605D was tried for 100 octane but it was only good for a marginal improvement, 1550 HP, so I guess it was not worth it. At the same time the Germans decided that 100 octane is the way for the BMW 801D series, and all FW 190A run on 100 octane.

The Merlin was a different story, at 27 liters it could not hope to compete with the 35 liter DB / Jumo engines without high boost and high octane fuel, heavy supercharging and the resulting need for a bulky intercooler installation. An interesting comparioson is the late war DB 605DB, which even at low boost had the performance of the two stage Merlin 6x series, without 100 octane, without an intercooler and without water injection.

The Germans could produce any number of high grade fuel, it was a matter of pressing B4 stock through another chemical process as far as I understand. It wasnt needed. Why use a more expensive fuel for the same results?

In short, high octane fuel was critical in development of the small displacement Merlin and not critical at all for the DB or Jumo engines. Despite that, the sources I have point that 100 octane fuel was used by the Luftwaffe in 109G, He 111H even when this was unnecessary - a sort of luxury in war, but it probably eased logistics.

We do seem to disagree in the analysis of those documents. I believe the documents you have posted clearly point to a limited issue of 100 octane to select fighter units, which was eased in August but did not materialize until the end of September 1940. Which means plenty of FC Sqns were still flying on 87 octane and corresponding limitations.

FYI I did ask Pips years ago but since he didn't have the reference handy, and the paper is not digitalized yet, so unavailable for online search (which I did), so I see no point. Its impossible to find a paper without a proper reference, simple as that.

I have all the facts I need. Whoever he is, he has discredited himself in my eyes. He is incapable of academic discussion, unable to support his claims, and making up bogus claims. he makes up for that with evasion and petty arrogance. In short, a waste of my time.

Unfortunately its not true. He claimed the only high octane fuel used and found by the British was of British origin. As the papers I have shown, this was not the case. The Germans used plenty of 100 octane of their own making.

He was wrong, and his research was amateurish, or deliberately presented false information.

I am talking about AVIA 10/282 I believe, the one you have posted excerpts from, ie. the August 1940 decision to authorize 100 octane fuel for all operational aircraft, the note that the fuel was issued to the 'units concerned' in May etc. If you can post this paper in its entirety for the whole of community to decide its contents for themselves, I think it would be mighty helpful and please accept my gratitude in advance.

Well we are in agreement then - isn't that a wonderful thing? I am sure the LW used British 100 octane, courtesy of the RAF after Dunkerque, to its benefit. Its a bit ironic isn't it. Additionally, the LW captured large stocks of French avgas. And, of course, it had its own domestic supply of 100 octane as per German specs.

My point was to point out the unsustainabilty of any partisan thesis about that the sole use of captured British stocks.


We have to agree to disagre here. For my point of view, there are too many flies - Pips papers, the note of Squadrons concerned and the lack of any paper saying universal use amongst others- in that ointment to make it believable. That being said, of course the RAF was using 100 octane for a fair number of fighter Squadrons, and for this reason a 100 oct / +12 boost variant is fully supportable for COD. Hence I supported Osprey's poll in the bug thread, despite his often petty and malicious contents. I just disagree that this should be the only variant modelled. I think a 87 octane version should be there as well, and mission builders / server hosts will decide what they would believe to be true.

I don't consider simplistic and wishful calculations, that ignore the needs of bombers, non-operational flights, engine testing etc. completely. But we do agree that primary sources should be the basis of any conclusion.

As far as I am concerned, Crumpp has technical and practical expertise, being involved in the restoration of a WW2 Fw 190, and practical piloting experience to boot.

On the other hand, you are kid with none of the above. If I just weight the two against each other, you don't came out very well.

Winny,

A shortage can be the result of any number of things. Yes, there was a shortage because the Strategic reserve to production ratio is just not where it should be.

In fact, that shortage continued almost throughout the war and is the subject of several meetings in the United States about 100 Octane production. That does not necessarily mean aircraft were feeling a shortage. It does mean the strategic reserves are short. Remember, they originally wanted 800,000 tons in reserve before a single operational aircraft used the fuel. Of course there is a shortage!!

Great example of why looking at strategic logistics is a horrible method to predict operational conditions is the German late war fuel situation on the western front. Strategically, Germany had plenty of fuel in their reserves. The shortage was at the operational side due to main supply route bottlenecks caused by allied airplanes shooting up the stockyards, railheads, and trucks!

Here's the page from the "June, 1940" Pilot's Notes that specifies the fuel (which actually is from "May, 1940" as can be seen in the "List of Content" of Section 1).
http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/attachm...0&d=1334948575

So now the story changes to "our 100 octane gave better performance than your 100 octane" when Kurfurst knows full well that only a handful of 109Es used 100 octane, versus the entire RAF FC while the 110 got slaughtered no matter what fuel it used.

In Adolf Gallands own words while speaking to Goering:

I have repeatedly challenged you to produce evidence of even a single Spitfire/Hurricane 87 octane operational squadron combat sortie during the BofB. This should be an easy task if, as you contend, the majority of RAF FC Spitfire/Hurricane operational squadrons were using 87 Octane fuel.

So I'll issue the challenge again and again, until you answer it or admit that your contention is unsupported by the historical record.

I'm still waiting for a reply.

Ignoring the tit for tat for a moment.

Can anyone tell me if a Merlin that had been converted to 100 could run on 87?

I don't want guesses or in my experience answers.. Please.

The reason I ask is that it appears that in the German machines it was not possible to interchange the fuel. (87 oct B-4 & 100 oct C-3) (Fighter Arm pamphlet Nr.1410144)

Also I recall reading somewhere that a converted Merlin would not run on 87 because of the modifications. I cannot find where I read it though.. Maybe I dreamt it!

A typical biased reply!!!

The difference was in the engines, the 27l Merline needed the 100 octane to compete with the 35l DB601 with 87 octane.
The DB601 with 100 octane was playing in another ballpark and restored the engine superiority until better Merlins appeared.

Merlin II/III: Yes

http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/attachm...0&d=1334948575

"100 octane may be used, if the engine has been suitable modified", if it wouldn't be possible it would state "must be used".

Merlin XII: Yes

http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/attachm...8&d=1332086871

It shows different engine limitations depending on used fuel.

For all British engines: Yes

http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/attachm...0&d=1334727256
http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/attachm...1&d=1334727263

Clearly states that it is possible, however the operational limits are lower.

Kurfurst
That file is many hundreds of pages long and you are not going to get it all, which meeting are you interested in or which paper of mine do you consider to be partial and I will post the rest.
I have looked up previous postings of yours and the one paper you have mentioned is the Oil Co ordination committee meeting after the May meeting when the roll out was confirmed as being complete. If you want something apart from that you need to be more precise

The 100 octane mods specify different plugs. Typically you will not want to run 87 octane in an engine with 100 octane plugs.

That is Kurfurst's MO

He has allways played both sides of the argument, posting in bold the items that support his arguments, ignoring the items that weaken his arguments.

With that said

Let's play thier game for the moment..

Lets assume that all RAF planes were running 87 oct and all nazi planes were using 100 oct..

Thus they are asking us to belive that the Spitfires runnin 87 oct were able to clear the skys of 109 running 100 oct

Would be interesting to see how they try and spin that one ;)

Of course and this is same note appears in the 1939 Operating Notes.

The fly in the ointment is the January 1942 Operating Notes clearly state, OPERATIONAL UNITS-100 OCTANE ONLY.

January 1942, Pilots Operating Notes, Spitfire Mk I:

http://img716.imageshack.us/img716/3...uary194202.jpg

That is definative and it is a fact all operational units flying a Spitfire are using 100 Octane in January 1942.

Before the January notes, the only mention of 100 Octane is "100 octane may be used, if the engine has been suitable modified" That "may be used....IF" is definative as well. All operational units flying a Spitfire Mk I were not using 100 Octane in June of 1940...for a fact.

Ace of Aces...ie Tagert, It was you who did not understand atmospheric conditions effect on aircraft performance and was crying about gameshapes being mismodeled.

When I pointed that out, you spent pages attacking me personally.

Then you proceed with "testing" showing the creation and destruction of energy. I tried to help you by explaining how a specific set of formulation, Total Energy Concepts for Aircraft Performance works and once again you spent your time flinging personal insults.

I would ask the mods to please remove those who contribute nothing but personal insults.

There is good information in this thread and I think we are getting closer to the answer.

According to AP1590B A.L. 4 (November 1940) the different sparking plugs are "very desirable" but not required. So using 100 octane with the regular sparking plugs seems to work, however it doesn't sound like a good idea. In addition it doesn't mean that the 100 octane plugs work satisfactory with 87 octane.

The major change is the cylinder heads. Without those, you are going to have cracking.

Exactly. It specifies the four types of plugs which may be used for 100 Octane. You would have to look the spark plugs authorized for 87 Octane and see if any of them match the part numbers.

I actually have to put the certificate that comes with a set of plugs in the logbook of the aircraft we work on and sign it. It is a required entry and the certificate must state the plugs are authorized to use in the aircraft.

Aircraft maintenace is very tightly controlled by convention.

Now wait ... did I understand that correct:

Didn't you just say some posts above that the use of 100 octane fuel on one day doesn't mean it was used on the next day?
So the RAF filled there aircraft on one day with 100 octane, changed the sparking plugs, did all the certificate stuff. On the next day the drained the tanks, filled in 87 octane, reverted to the old sparking plugs, again certificate stuff.

And if they were really fast they might find have one hour per day to fight the Luftwaffe.

Seriously?

If nothing has changed in a chapter, it will be added "as is" to the new publication. That is one of the reasons all the convention signers went to a standard format for all POH's in the 1980's. The edition cover, changes, and new table of contents is generally republished. The British manuals publish a table with each manual listing the updates incorporated, it is at the front of the Operating Notes.


German Flugzueg Handbuchs can be a nightmare to put together by chapter because of this too. That is why we get paper originals and not electronic copies. I find the wartime German system, especially the parts manuals, a pain in the rear to look up information. Good detail, drawing, and information but tedious to work with.

Then back up your "facts" with something substantive:

Explain how 16 Squadrons consumed 52,000 tons of 100 Octane fuel in just 3 months (Jul - October) with documentation.

Explain which squadrons were selected for your "intensive operational trials" and explain how the RAF ensured that only the selected units were supplied, with documentation.

You insist that the RAF needed to have 800,000 tons of 100 octane in reserve, based on pre-war papers, yet you have never explained why the RAF was using "Other Grades" when the reserves of those were falling below the reserves of 100 Octane as the battle progressed; if, as you state
I repeat, the "reserves to production ratio" of "Other Grades" of fuel was falling below that of 100 Octane; taking that hypothesis to its logical conclusion the RAF would not have been using any fuel.

But, wait, there's more, "That does not necessarily mean aircraft were feeling a shortage"...really hedging your bets there Crumpp.

You then go on to state:

A poor comparison because the RAF's supply system was not put under the same strain and the RAF was able to supply its airfields throughout the battle.

All this means is that you want things both ways - first you insist the reserves were inadequate, and have spent ages pushing that position - now you insist weeell it doesn't matter anyway.

One or t'other - did the RAF have enough reserves of 100 Octane fuel to potentially supply all frontline fighter squadrons throughout the battle - yes or no?

Ok, so if you were running a spitfire with 100 oct would you have to change the plugs drain the tanks, clean out the fuel pipes etc before putting 87 in it?

What I'd like to know is, once the engine was converted was that it.. Did it stay as a 100 oct only engine? Earlier in the thread there were comments to the effect that they used both fuel types in the same machines. I find this hard to believe.

It's an important point because if it's a big job to change fuels then surely it makes no operational sense to switch, that also would mean that if a spit landed at an airfield other than it's own( a common occurrence during BoB) and they didn't have 100 octane then that's one machine out of action.

Logically this makes no sense. You'd only convert if you were confident that it wouldn't impact on operations. This is speculation on my part, just a thought bubble really.

Sure I did and it is true.

I don't know the plugs authorized for 87 Octane fuel. Do you?

Since 87 Octane is more volatile than 100 Octane, the hotter plugs will work fine but that is a guess.

Most importantly, a set of plugs is much cheaper than Avgas especially in a WWII Fighter; they are even cheaper than a tank of oil. The RAF would save a considerable amount of money if they ran units on rest and refit status on 87 Octane as noted in the January 1942 Operating Notes.

That is exactly why they note other units not on operational status, 87 Octane!!


I know you’re trying to be sarcastic but maybe you can see things from a more grounded perspective.

This idea that a squadrons will run one fuel for a test flight in say the morning and then go through all the changes in the afternoon for an operational mission then reverse the whole thing for an engine test is simply not a goer. The effort and potential for a mistake and or conamination is just too great

When you look at the OOB some squadrons are down as operational and others as non operational. I am confident that operational squadrons would have used 100 octane and non operational squadrons 87 octane

When a squadron was rotated North they didn't become non operational, they could still be called on for missions but the chances of combat were much reduced. Some squadrons that had very heavy losses sometimes were deemed non operational but that wasn't the norm.

Bases normally held some 87 octane for aircraft passing through, station hacks, squadron communication aircraft and the like but the aircraft that could be used on ops would have been well looked after and besides at the height of the battle you couldn't take the chance of being caught on the ground changing fuel.

I don't know the plugs authorized for 87 Octane so I can't tell you. It is a possibility. I can tell you if you could do it, it would noted in the operating instructions or the maintenance manuals.

I can also say, you could not use +12lbs boost if you contaminated the system with significant amounts of 87 Octane.

I think you are beginning to see the maintenance nightmare airplanes can be even with something as simple as putting new gas into them!!

:grin:

If I wanted to convert and it was not possible to convert the entire force, the first thing I would do is get as much 100 Octane gas to the airfields as I could before anyone converted. Then my conversion pool has a supply of gas.

In theory, the operating limits of the engines were not raised no matter which avgas you put in it. As long as you did not use +12lbs with 87 octane gas, you sould be ok with an engine modified for 100 Octane.

There is a thing called a ferry certificate that covers things like this in aviation. Depending on the technical issue, it can be complicated or very simple to get one. I am sure in the RAF, something like this was a phone call to the Maintenance officer who did the paperwork and approved it in order to ferry a plane back under special conditions.

Typically you can always go higher in octane but never lower in piston engines but airplanes are not typical. In airplanes each installation even of the same engine type is different. You generally can't tell much about the Merlin in a Hurricane by looking at the Spitfire's instructions for example. That is why the Air Ministry tested both types.

Your 87 Octane engines in theory could run without incidence on 100 Octane. It would be specified in the Pilots Notes and the fuel tank placarded for all fuel types authorized for the aircraft.

As far as I'm concerned, Crumpp is American, which means his PPL was easy and cheap. He wouldn't be able to afford it or understand it in England. He can't even drive a car with a manual gearbox.

On the other hand, you are a snoodler with nothing above your cerebellum. If I were to weigh your head, it would be much lighter than average, you don't come out very well.

All very well and good - how about finding some documentation confirming your speculation about the RAF using 100 Octane for nothing more than operational trials?

Was there enough 100 octane fuel available to allow all operational frontline units to fly all defensive sorties flown throughout the battle - yes or no? If no why not - with documentation.

Why would you do that Glider? I don't think anyone is saying that.

What would be worth it to do is change the fuel type when the units rotated out for rest and refit. They are not doing any operational flying under that status and unless they had an additional mission to gather data on the fuels use, there is no reason to continue to use 100 Octane. I am sure maintenance trend data over as many hours of flight time was required before the entire force converted but you don't need it from every squadron.

Crumpps steps to conversion.....

If I wanted to convert and it was not possible to convert the entire force, the first thing I would do is get as much 100 Octane gas to the airfields as I could before anyone converted. Then my conversion pool has a supply of gas.

The next thing I would do is convert as many squadrons as possible to be able to use 100 Octane. That timeline is going to be based on how fast the parts required can enter the system and reach the point of use. I would convert as many aircraft as possible without violating the required logistical ratio so my airplanes can continue to fly and I am not without airplanes due to maintenance awaiting parts. Now I have pool of capable aircraft.

As much as possible all of my operational squadrons using 100 Octane would be down in 11 Group in the thick of the action.

If logistics said I only had enough fuel for 16 squadrons by September then you can bet when a squadron rotated out for rest and refit, they would go back to 87 Octane and their replacement would come from that pool of converted units.

As logistics increased my usable fuel supply, I would add operational squadrons to other areas until the entire force was converted.

How about some documentation supporting your claims?

The fact the RAF did not complete conversion to 100 Octane until around January 1940 is evident in the Operating Notes.

The documentation is posted and been posted several times.

What I said is what I see in all the documentation posted in this thread.


It is a fact the RAF did not complete conversion to 100 Octane until around January 1940. That is evident in the Operating Notes.

No it hasn't been posted:

Please show documentation that the RAF was only interested in operational trials

Can you not see a genuine problem in telling some of your frontline pilots it was okay to use 100 Octane plus 12 lbs boost in an emergency, while telling the majority "sorry chaps, can't use it, tough luck?"

Therefore, provide some documentation proving that pilots engaged in frontline operations were discouraged from using 100 Octane fuel.

Was there enough 100 octane fuel available to allow all operational frontline units to fly all defensive sorties flown throughout the battle - yes or no? If no why not - with documentation.

Provide some documentation showing that the reserves of 100 octane were considered far too low to be used.

Otherwise everything you say is pure, unsupported conjecture and speculation, based on your wishful thinking that RAF wartime operations can be analysed by comparing them with modern peacetime civilian operational standards.

Yeah of course it is. It's like buying a DVD player isn't it. You get your instruction manual as part of the package and it does what it says in the instructions.

Meaning what you want to see in all the documentation posted;

but you have completely neglected answering some key questions such as how your "16 Squadrons" got through 52,000 tons of 100 Octane in just a few months of operational trials. Can you explain this at all, with supporting evidence?

The rest of your hypothesis is still just unsupported speculation.

No, there is no hypothesis. Anyone who knows how aviation handbooks work by convention will say the same thing.

It is a fact the RAF did not complete conversion to 100 Octane until around January 1940. That is evident in the Operating Notes.

Obviously, you have never been in the Military. It happens every time a new piece of equipment is introduced.

I don't know the exact figures.. It's late..But
If you were in a Squadron you were operational. End of. No matter which Group you were part of.

If you read Bungays Most Dangerous Enemy he gives figures for the number of reserve (or non-operational) Aircraft that the RAF had. It is quite a large number and it was kept at an almost constant level for the duration of the BoB.

There was no rest and refit. Except where a squadron had been decimated.

They were simply rotated to less busy groups. All of the RAF's fighter groups were "operational" they were all involved in combat throughout. There were raids on Glasgow, Birmingham, Liverpool, Manchester, Bristol, Southampton, Newcastle, Coventry, Wolverhampton ... I could go on.

Please don't try and tell me 9,10,11,12,13 or 14 Group were not operational. They were.

You're basically saying that seasoned fighter pilots were told that they no longer needed 100 octane because they were part of 14 group?
You expect me to believe that they sat on thier airfield and said "Jerry's not coming today boys.. better fill up with 87 octane"
No way. The most important factor for interception is how fast you can get some altitude (the only real advantage of 100 octane)

100 octanes importance has nothing to do with the unrealistic turning fights depicted in CloD and how it affected the chances against a 109. It was about getting up there where the bombers were. It is stupid to assume that because they were no longer in the south east that this factor changed.

It may well be that OTU's were running on 87, but...
I'd like someone to find me a fighter squadron that was non operational during the BoB.

NO, almost every military cycle their units especially during wartime. All units need time to rest, refit, and train as well as perform other administrative duties as required.

In the United State Army for example, you have green, amber, and red cycles. Red is downtime for rest, refit, and administrative duties like funeral details and post clean up. Amber is training time and preparation for becoming an operational unit. Green is operational.

Dowding definitely cycled Fighter Command during the Battle of Britain.

No, there was a rotation and squadrons were allowed to rest and refit.

Once again, please explain how 16 squadrons got through over 50,000 tons of aviation fuel in just a few months of "operational trials". documentation, not your speculation.

Please show us that the RAF was only interested in "Operational Trials" at a time when the country was facing full scale air assault - documentation, not your speculation.

Not really other than both come with instructions. Nobody cares if you don't follow the instructions on your DvD player.

In Aviation, not following the publications carries the weight of law.

You are wrong.

Find me one example of an RAF fighter Squadron that was rested, pulled out of the front line for training, or for 'administration purposes' during the Battle of Britian. The only reason a squadron was 'rested' was because most of the pilots were dead.

They were not being rotated out for the reasons you state. They were moved to another active group. Almost without exception.

Just because you say it happened dosn't mean it did. Read Al Deers account of what hapened to his squadron, or Pete Brothers or Geoff Wellum or Baders, or Lane or Hillary or Viggors or Page or Malan or Townsend or Dundas. I've read them all and none of them were made non operational during the Battle of Britian.

They kept going till they died or broke down.

It has all been explained to you before in this thread. You just did not bother to try and understand it. You would rather sling insults.

Go back and read it if you are interested. I would be glad to discuss it with you.

If you are not interested in going back and reading it, I am not interested in re-explaining it to you.

This is also wrong. The publication is over-ridden by orders and by leaflets issued by the Air Ministry
If you bother to read the first page of your pilot's notes you'll notice that it states this very clearly.

Anything else you want to make up off the top of your head?

This.

http://ww2today.com/24th-november-19...d-from-the-raf

http://www.battleofbritain1940.net/document-21.html

http://www.raf.mod.uk/history/thebattleofbritain.cfm

http://helena-schrader.com/bob.html

Rested in a quieter sector ie not 11 group and withdrawn totally from ops are not the same thing.....

Also seeing as this seems to now be a discussion that hinges on what an operational squadron is..

Operational squadrons by Group
14th July 1940
10 Group 2 Hurricane 2 Spitfire
11 Group 12 Hurricane 7 Spitfire
12 Group 6 Hurricane 5 Spitfire
13 Group 5 Hurricane 5 Spitfire
Total 25 Hurricane sqn. 19. Spitfire sqn.

1st September 1940
10 Gp Hu-4 Sp-4
11 Gp Hu-14 Sp-6
12 Gp Hu-6 Sp-6
13 Gp Hu-9 Sp-2
Total Hu-33 Sp 18

30th September
10 Gp Hu-6 Sp-3
11 Gp Hu-13 Sp-7
12 Gp Hu-6 Sp-6
13 Gp Hu-9* Sp-3
*includes 2 half strength squadrons (they were still operational)
Total Hu-34 Sp-19

28th October
10 Gp Hu-6 Sp-3
11 Gp Hu-13 Sp-8
12 Gp Hu-7 Sp-6
13 Gp Hu-7* Sp-3
*includes 1 part strength squadron
Total Hu-33 Sp-20

They were moved to other operational Groups! All of them.

Find me a squadron that was moved to a non-operational Airfield.

From memory I think the only squadron that was actually withdrawn was 54 squadron - mainly because nearly everybody was dead! (this is probably why the number of Spitfire Squadrons in 11 group went down by 1 between July and September)

That does not have anything to do with new editions of the Operating Notes being published.

You as the operator are always responsible for getting the latest information about your aircraft. It is telling the operator that new Air Ministry orders and leaflets are supplements too that edition of the Operating Notes. The Operator is responsible for keeping his information up to date.

New editions will incorporate all the Air Ministry Order and Leaflets enacted since the previous edition.

Once again...

It is a fact the RAF did not complete conversion to 100 Octane until around January 1940. That is evident in the Operating Notes.

Winny,

It is a fact Dowding rotated and rested his squadrons. All Groups did not bear the same operational burden.

I presume you don't actually mean January 1940, and instead Jan 41?

But they were still on ops, hence why withdrawn and rotated are two different things. 12 and 13 groups still flew ops, no one is arguing that they weren't rotated in and out of 11 group.

It does not matter.

All Groups did not bear the same burden and if only part of your force is using the fuel, I would give it to the guys with largest operational burden.

It is all speculation.

Oh and you even missed this - you highlighted the wrong bit..

Although squadrons were being rotated around the country, with battered units being withdrawn to the North to rest and the fresher squadrons moving from north to south, the pilots were becoming increasingly worn out.

Not very well rested then were they?

I agree with you, and have been saying that from day one in this rather long thread, that it makes sense that 11 group had it over the other groups, as a priority.

But at the start of this thread even that notion was disputed, and clearly even you have to admit, 100 octane fuel was used, and the were spits running around with the potential to go to 12lbs boost, and they were almost certainly in 11 group during the BoB, yes/no?

No, I thought you said before that it was All operational aircraft?

So now it's just the operational squadrons that have the 'largest burden' ?

really?

Winny,

The Operating Notes say that in the January 1941 edition. None of the earlier editions make any note of it at all under operating limitations. 100 Octane is a minor footnote of "may be used.....IF converted" in all previous editions of the Operating Notes.

It is a fact the RAF did not complete conversion to 100 Octane until around January 1941. That is evident in the Operating Notes.

I am not disputing the fact that squadrons were rotated - I'm saying that only one squadron was withdrawn - ie. made non operational.

Where have I said that they were not rotated?
I'm saying that they were not withdrawn.

So again - find me all these withdrawn (non operational) fighter squadrons.. the ones that you say were using 87 octane

Read my first post in this thread. Your perception is totally wrong if you include me, fruitbat.

I said I don't know and niether does anyone else. We still don't know an exact date.

It is a fact that conversion of all operational Spitfire Mk I's was important enough to warrent a warning in paragraph 1, operating limitations of the Pilots Operating Notes in January, 1941.

We can definately say that full conversion did not take place in June 1940 or earlier as no such warning exist's in the Operating Notes.

Based on the ever increase amount of 100 Octane at the airfields evidenced in Table II, it is highly unlikely it was the major fuel until around October, 1940.


Yes but not all of them and certainly not the entire Fighter Command.

The frequency would depend on the timeframe and the dates one picks for the battle. It looks to me like the fuel came into use in July and gradually became more common until total conversion around January.

If you say the Battle of Britian lasted from July to 15 September, 100 Octane is pretty limited.

If you say the battle went from July to December then 100 Octane was probably the standard at the end of it.

I have no idea where your first post in this thread is, and i wasn't talking about you specifically.

Since there were some operational history reports posted here somewhere showing Hurricanes that had been adapted to 100 octane fuel running around in the Battle of France, which ended in may, i conclude quite confidently that 100 octane MUST of been introduce before July, when i don't know myself.

I am not disputing your pilots notes and total conversion of every spit no matter where it was stationed in jan'41 though.

From the ops records i've seen here and elsewhere, it is clear from the dates which are always on these documents that many frontline if not all 11 group squadrons were converted in the main before July, so i do disagree with your opinion

as far as 11 group is concerned.

Winny,

It is a fact Dowding rotated and rested his squadrons.

It is not speculation or assumption, the squadrons were rotated and rested. It was very contraversial and that argument is covered in some detail in the official RAF History. I personally believe it was an essential part of the RAF victory.

Keep in mind that tactically, the RAF SE fighters took a pasting from the Luftwaffe SE fighters with the exception of July 1940. Very good pre-war planning, good leadership, most significantly brave men and women all allowed the RAF to increase its strength during the battle to ultimately prevail.

For the Luftwaffe, it is an example of tactical success ending in a defeat in the campaign.


http://img94.imageshack.us/img94/838...rationallo.jpg

Ok, we are good.

No issue at all.

Take the ones that specifically say "100 Octane fuel in use" like this one:

http://img29.imageshack.us/img29/7303/151orb16feb40.jpg

Just like this one, it will specifically state if they are using the fuel.

Throw out the ones that just note conversion like this one:

http://img268.imageshack.us/img268/5323/no611100oct.jpg

And you will have a more accurate idea of the timeline and extent.

It won't be dead on but at least you won't have conversion mixed in with use.

There is some very good knowledge in your community. It is hampered by the "us vs them", win-lose mentality, emotional investment, and immaturity of some the members.

Note what the 611 Sqn ORB says:

21/3: Fuel: The new aircraft are one by one being converted...for the use of 100 Octane fuel, instead of D.T.D 230.

By arbitrarily "throwing" the 611 Sqn ORB out because it says "conversion" instead of "using the fuel" the fact that it notes that 100 octane fuel was being used instead of 87 octane is completely missed, plus it says 9 aircraft converted. So dump that "rule".

Here are two other ORBs from February 1940, from before before the issue of AP1590B/J.2-W, March 20 1940. That's four squadrons, plus four airbases North Weald, Digby, Hornchurch (11 Group) and Drem 13 Group confirmed to be converted or in the process of being converted to use the fuel in Feb-March 1940 alone. All indicate that 100 Octane fuel was the only type of fuel being used by converted aircraft.

Before you say "only four squadrons" these are ORBs of the time which have been found so far, that does not mean that these were the only squadrons in the RAF to convert.

Those from February also show that the conversion of Merlins was well underway before A.P1590B/J.2-W was issued, confirming what the document says.

I think that some people have stated that non operational flights were done on 100 octane and non operational flights on 87 octane. Postings have been made saying that in one month a squadrons did X operational flights and Y non operational flights.

We agree that this wouldn't have happened which is good

The difference between us is that when they moved for rest normally to a Group in the North they normally remained as Operational squadrons. Look at the OOB and compare then number of Operational and Non operational squadrons. A handfull are non operational. As I said Operational used 100 octane and non operational 87 Octane.

Your steps are basically the same as the RAF, The fuel had been issued by May 1940, the changes to the aircraft were very small, took about a day and the task was completed in May. The March paper listing the changes showed that the major conversion task was already included in new engines or in normal routine maintanence, all that was left was drilling a couple of holes so that side of the Logistics was covered, all that was left was delivering the fuel of which there was no shortage.

Now you seem to have dropped the pretence that 1940 was about operational testing which is good, now can you supply the 16 squadrons evidence?

Now, to France 7 May 1940: the RAF stored 660,056 gallons, 2111 tons of 100 octane versus 561,076 gallons, 1,778 tons, of 87 Octane in France: this was before the balloon went up, 4 Hurricane squadrons listed plus 9 Blenheim, all operating with 100 Octane:

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...cks-7may40.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...stocks-pg1.jpg

and was requesting extra fuel for Blenheims, 188 gallons each for the outer tanks, plus 280 gallons of 87 Octane for the inner tanks.

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...stocks-pg2.jpg

And here the projected requirement for 100 Octane was far greater than that for 87: 1,579,740 gallons, 5,007 tons V 950,000 gallons or 3,011 tons.

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...nt-15may40.jpg

If the RAF was only interested in building up stocks of 100 octane fuel before releasing it for use why would 100 octane fuel be sent to France to support the squadrons of the BEF? I presume your assumption is that the 4 Hurricane squadrons and 9 Blenheim squadrons were to be used for "operational trials?"

On 7 May more 100 Octane was stocked in France than 87 Octane, and projected requirements for 100 Octane were also far greater - this for a fuel you say was only used in "operational trials".

The requirement to supply 9 Blenheim squadrons - note on the second to last page the stipulation "ALL reinforcing Blenheim units require aviation fuel, per aircraft as follows: (i) 100 octane. 188 gallons (ii) D.T.D 230. 280 gallons - with 100 octane contradicts the pre-war paper which stipulates that only 16 fighter squadrons and a couple of Blenheim squadrons were to use 100 octane fuel before September 1940.

It is your opinion, not a fact, and you are in a minority of 1. Even Kurfurst doesn't support you.

Note that Kurfurst has made his counter move to powerful Spitfires by trying to get a late and rare 109 included into the BoB which pretty much demonstrates that his agenda is stat-padding all along. Good luck to him, I wouldn't deny anything to the Luftwaffe that was there all along, although as a mission maker for our server I wouldn't include it without regulation.....

http://www.il2bugtracker.com/issues/200

Actually you mean January 1942, at a time where there was not a single operational squadron operating the Spitfire I.
The Pilot's Notes page from May 1940 simply doesn't specify which unit should use what fuel, so this doesn't tell us anything about how widespread the use was at that time.

Some people seem to enjoy going in circles, but from a logical point of view it is impossible to prove that "all operational units used 100 octane fuel during BoB".
An analogy - if someone claimed that there are orange ravens, it cannot be disproved by showing thousands of black ones. However, to support the claim, it would be necessary to show a couple of orange ones - that would close the case and therefore, it is the way an argumentation needs to follow here.
Back to the 100 octane fuel, this topic has provided plenty of information and documentation regarding the use in 1940. Papers, memos, storage lists, logbooks, manuals, pilot and ground crew instruction, pilot accounts - all there to prove beyond doubt that 100 octane fuel was used.
What I'm missing is prove of 87 octane fuel being used in operational units. So, can anyone come up with a definite proof that an operational squadron used 87 octane fuel lets say until the end of September 1940?
I think that that kind of info, for instance a squadron logbook dating the conversion to 100 octane fuel in October 1940, would be far more valuable than another 500 posts trying to convince each other of something people simply do not want to believe.

Don't be ridiculous NZ, obviously one of the safest places you could store and build up your stock of precious fuel is on the front line facing the enemy when you in full retreat. Don't use it mind, there are only lives at stake - it's more important to build it up first.

Couldn't agree more and a normal person would understand that, but we have a 'special' person arguing the case against here who is better than all of us. I know this because he flies an aeroplane himself and polishes a 190 for a rich man.

According to his logic there can't have been more than a few thousand dinosaurs inhabiting the earth in total during that great span of a few hundred million years between the Jurassic and Cretaceous periods of our planet, on the basis that these are the only fossils that have been found. Furthermore, if you take into account modern livestock farming methods and regulations then their existence was even more implausible because every farmer knows that keeping a herd of Brontosauruses is not defined anywhere and they wouldn't fit in a modern cowshed for milking.

I'm sorry but.. I said I know he rotated squadrons I have 42 books on the subject of the BoB. I know a lot about the subject.

It seems that you are failing to understand the difference between rotated and withdrawn.

The reason I brought it up was because..

You said "If logistics said I only had enough fuel for 16 squadrons by September then you can bet when a squadron rotated out for rest and refit, they would go back to 87 Octane and their replacement would come from that pool of converted units.
"

There was no pool of converted units - all of the RAF's FC squadrons were active.

I'm saying that to suggest that they forced pilots back onto 87 octane when they moved to a different group does not stack up.
100 octanes only real advantage was in rate of climb. All groups were operational and all groups were involved in combat.

The RAF at the beginning had around 2,200 aircraft IN TOTAL FC, BC ,CC and transport. FC had around 6-700 aircraft. This is where the focus for 100 octane was placed.


EDIT: And you also said "I highly doubt the Air Ministry had 100 Octane fuels in any substantial quantity in 1938"
So I post the original documents which show they did have large stocks and you come back that 'logistical has nothing to do with operational" or words to that effect.